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ABSTRACT 
 
Since its origins, the European Union has been focused on removing the barriers to the full 
integration of its members’ economies. But while formal institutions have adapted, have informal 
social norms also changed? In this paper, I use the variables from the World Values Survey to 
estimate the cultural “distance” between countries, with the goal of examining the extent to 
which cultural distance and bilateral trade are related. Gravity regressions are used to determine 
the extent to which cultural distance affects trade flows; I find that cultural distance reduces 
trade, but less for EU members than for the rest of the world. I then explore the determinants of 
cultural distance. For most country-pairs in the sample, trade is found to increase rather than 
decrease the cultural distance between countries, but for EU members, trade reduces cultural 
distance. 
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I.  Introduction and Literature Review 
The history of the European Union is an ongoing story of removing barriers and promoting 
integration. From the removal of tariffs, promised by the Treaty of Rome and achieved by 1968, 
to the Single European Act guaranteeing a complete internal market, to Maastricht’s goal of a 
common monetary policy, the continual theme is integration. But while the formal institutions 
and laws governing economic interactions have changed, have the EU countries’ underlying 
cultures—the norms and beliefs of their citizens—changed as well? Further, to what extent has 
trade in goods influenced this cultural change? This paper focuses on the relationship between 
culture and trade. This is a complex relationship, since it is likely both that the cultural 
differences between countries affect the trade that occurs between them, and that the goods that 
countries trade lead to changes in culture as well. The direction of these links is not clear, 
however. It is possible that countries that are closer together in cultural terms may trade more, 
since a similar culture gives individuals an advantage in terms of communication—but it is also 
possible that, if trade is based on comparative advantage, countries with different cultures may 
trade more. Likewise, trade may allow the flow of ideas, causing countries’ cultures to become 
more similar, or it may cause nations to become more entrenched in their own cultural 
differences. 
 
It is important first of all to define what is meant by the word “culture.” The terms “culture,” 
“institutions,” “norms,” “social capital,” and so on have become ubiquitous in the economics 
literature, and yet a clear definition of each term has not yet been agreed upon. Douglass North, 
in his 1993 Nobel Prize lecture, stated the following: “Institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, 
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constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of 
societies and specifically economies.”2 North’s informal constraints (norms and codes of 
conduct) are what I think of as culture. White and Tadesse (2008) define culture as a 
“population’s shared habits and traditions, learned beliefs and customs, attitudes, norms, and 
values” (1079). While the formal means of enforcing institutions (laws, constitutions) may 
change only slowly and in discrete ways, the informal means (culture) may change more quickly 
– and changes in culture, over time, lead to changes in formal institutions. Guiso et al. (2006) 
claim that culture remains “fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (23), but on the 
contrary, I believe that culture can indeed change; in particular, it may change when individuals 
in a country are exposed to other beliefs and values, such as can occur through trade. 
 
Gravity models explore the determinants of bilateral trade and include both “pull” and “push” 
factors to explain what helps or hinders the individuals in two countries when engaging in 
international trade. Many authors (Melitz 2008, Guo 2004, Hutchinson 2005) have shown that 
speaking a common language facilitates international trade transactions. As well, if two countries 
share a colonizer, they may employ a common framework for interactions (Bastos and Silva 
2008). A common language and a common colonizer are often included as dummy variables in 
gravity regressions and are usually thought to be stable over time. But if culture can change, and 
changes more when countries are exposed to international trade, then it is important to consider 
measures of culture that can change over time.  
 
 
                                                            
2 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html 
DRAFT: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
 
3 
 
The World Values Survey, an international survey undertaken in almost 100 countries over the 
last 30 years, provides a way to measure changes in culture over time. The World Values Survey 
provides data for five waves of surveys: 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 
2005-2008, although not every country is surveyed in every wave. On average, 1400 individuals 
are interviewed in each country, and the survey is nationally representative. Respondents are 
asked questions such as “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Answers to such questions over a 30-
year time period may show a change in social norms over time.  
 
Sociologists have used the World Values Survey questionnaires to study happiness, 
democratization, and modernity (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Inglehart and Baker 2000, Inglehart 
et al. 2008). Economists have particularly focused on trust and how it affects per-capita GDP 
(Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1997, Beugelsdijk 2006). Tabellini (2010) uses the 
World Values Survey to measure the effect of culture on economic development in the regions of 
Europe, using regional data for 8 countries. Other surveys have also been used to measure 
culture. Guiso et al. (2009) use the Eurobarometer surveys to examine how bilateral trust affects 
bilateral trade, but they include only 17 European countries. Disdier and Mayer (2007) also use 
Eurobarometer surveys, finding that the opinions of the EU15 citizens regarding new entrants 
have an effect on bilateral trade. Only the World Values Survey, however, provides data on all 
27 European Union countries, as well as a large set of industrial and developing countries around 
the world. 
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In this paper, I examine the difference between countries’ norms as a way of explaining the trade 
flowing between them, and I also show whether trade itself can help to explain these cultural 
differences. As countries engage in trade, they discover the ideas, methods, and technologies that 
are embodied in the goods that they import. Such repeated exposure to foreign ideas may lead to 
changes in social norms. The Silk Route is a historical example of trade that enabled cultural 
change. As Chan (2007) puts it, “Learning useful foreign values is similar to acquiring useful 
foreign technologies” (737), and he shows how openness leads to trust. Kónya (2006) states that 
“cultural costs differ from physical ones in that they can be eliminated by learning” (494). Coyne 
and Williamson (2009) show how openness (measured by the share of exports and imports in 
GDP) affects a measure of culture derived from WVS surveys, but they do not examine bilateral 
relationships. 
 
Section II describes the empirical framework to be used in the regressions, and Section III 
identifies empirical issues to be addressed. Section IV presents the results. Section V concludes. 
 
II.  The Trade and Culture Relationship 
The goal of this paper is to determine both how cultural differences affect bilateral trade, and 
how bilateral trade affects cultural differences, and to see how these relationships differ for 
European Union countries. The World Values Survey is used to construct a measure of the 
cultural distance between two countries. 
 
Measurement of cultural distance 
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To measure cultural distance, I use four variables from the World Values Survey. Tabellini 
(2010) and Coyne and Williamson (2009) use these same four variables to construct their 
measure of culture: trust, respect, control, and obedience. Trust is the percentage of respondents 
who agree that “most people can be trusted.” Trust may affect trade because a high level of trust 
in others may reduce transaction costs, leading to a greater ability and willingness to engage in 
international transactions. Respect is the percentage of respondents who say that “tolerance and 
respect for other people” is a quality that it is important for children to learn at home. If an 
individual has a high respect measure, the individual may be more willing to engage with those 
outside their immediate network. Control is the average response (from 1 to 100) that indicates 
how much “freedom of choice and control in life” respondents feel. Individuals who feel that 
they can control their lives are more likely to try to improve their own well-being. Obedience is 
the percentage of respondents who say that “obedience” is a quality that it is important for 
children to learn at home. A society emphasizing this quality may be one that discourages risk-
taking and pursues fewer outside transactions. Tables 1A to 1D show the trust, respect, control, 
and obedience measures for each of the 27 European Union countries.3 
 
The four variables are merged into one cultural distance variable as follows. For each country, I 
find the average level of trust, respect, control, and obedience. Overall cultural distance is then: 
ඨሺݐݎݑݏݐ1 െ ݐݎݑݏݐ2ሻଶ ൅ ሺݎ݁ݏ݌݁ܿݐ1 െ ݎ݁ݏ݌݁ܿݐ2ሻଶ ൅ ሺܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈1 െ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈2ሻଶ൅ሺ݋ܾ݁݀݅݁݊ܿ݁1 െ ݋ܾ݁݀݅݁݊ܿ݁2ሻଶ   
For example, in the 2005-2008 period, among the first 12 members of the European Union, the 
pair of countries that was most culturally “near” to each other was Germany and Italy, with a 
                                                            
3 The numbers for the United Kingdom represent Great Britain only, as Northern Ireland was not surveyed in every 
period. 
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cultural distance score of 13.17, and the country-pair that was the most culturally “far” from each 
other was Germany and the United Kingdom, with a cultural distance of 32.58. In the 2005-2008 
wave of the World Values Survey, trust was 33.8 for Germany, 27.5 for Italy, and 30.0 for the 
U.K.; respect was 75.1 in Germany, 74.4 in Italy, and 85.3 in the U.K.; control was 68 in 
Germany, 63 in Italy, and 73 in the U.K.; and obedience was 15.6 in Germany, 26.3 in Italy, and 
46.2 in the U.K. In the whole sample, Hong Kong in 2005-2008 is the most culturally distant 
from its trading partners, while Spain in 1981-1984 is the culturally most near.  
 
How does cultural distance affect trade? 
I use the gravity model to establish the determinants of bilateral trade. The augmented gravity 
model contains both the basic gravity variables (GDP of the exporter and importer, as well as the 
distance between them) and an additional set of explanatory variables. The full model is as 
follows: Exportsij = f(Cultural Distanceij, GDPi, GDPj, Distanceij, GDP per capitai, GDP per 
capitaj, Remotenessi, Remotenessj, Common Borderij, Landlockedij, Common Languageij, 
Common Colonizerij), where Cultural Distance is as described above, Exportsij represents real 
exports from country i to country j (nominal exports in current U.S. dollars divided by the U.S. 
CPI); GDPi is the gross domestic product of country i in constant 2000 U.S. dollars; GDPj is the 
gross domestic product of country j; Distanceij is the great-circle distance between the capital 
cities of countries i and j; GDP per capitai and GDP per capitaj are GDP divided by population 
for countries i and j, respectively; Remotenessi is the average distance of country i from its 
trading partners, weighted by GDP and Remotenessj is the same for country j;4 and the additional 
variables are dummies indicate, respectively, whether the two countries share a border; whether 
either or both of the countries is landlocked (this is not a binary variable, but rather can take the 
                                                            
4 Remotenessi is therefore calculated as 1/Σj (GDPjDistanceij), and Remotenessj as 1/Σi (GDPiDistanceij). 
DRAFT: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
 
7 
 
values of 0, 1, or 2); whether they have a common language; and whether they share the same 
colonizer. The expectation is that an increase in the GDP of either the exporting or importing 
country will raise exports. An increase in distance is expected to reduce exports. An increase in 
either country’s level of development (GDP per capita) is expected to raise exports. A rise in 
remoteness is predicted to raise the level of trade between a given pair of countries. The idea 
behind remoteness is that, if a country-pair is far from other potential trading partners, the pair’s 
trade may be higher than otherwise. Head (2003) uses the example of Australia and New Zealand 
as compared to Austria and Portugal. The two pairs are of roughly equal size in terms of GDP, 
and their capitals are the same distance apart—yet Australia and New Zealand trade nine times 
as much with each other as do Austria and Portugal. This is because their alternative trading 
partners are so distant that Australia and New Zealand are in some sense forced to rely on each 
other more than the traditional gravity regressors would imply. Such remoteness variables have 
been found (by Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, among others) to be highly significant in 
gravity regressions. All of the dummy variables are expected to have positive coefficients, 
representing increased trade, other than being landlocked, which is predicted to reduce exports. 
 
Data on exports from each country to every other country in the world are made available by the 
IMF in its Direction of Trade Statistics. (Data prior to the year 2000 were graciously provided by 
Andrew K. Rose.) Data on GDP and population are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Distance is calculated using the great-circle method, and remoteness is 
calculated as the GDP-weighted average of a country’s distance from all of its trading partners. 
The gravity dummy variables were obtained from Andy Rose 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/). 
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As well as the standard gravity variables, I also include dummy variables representing EU 
membership to see whether belonging to the European Union raises or lowers the trade between 
a pair of countries, holding constant their GDPs, the distance between them, and so on. I first 
include a dummy variable (EU) that is equal to 1 if both countries are members of the EU. I next 
include a dummy variable (EUold) that is equal to 1 if both countries are among the first 12 
members of the EU (i.e., had joined by 1986); this set includes Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. In the same regression, I include a dummy variable (EUnew) that is equal to 1 if both 
countries are among the most recent 12 entrants to the EU; this includes Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. Finally, I run regressions that include a dummy variable (EUoldnew) that is equal to 1 
if one of the trading partners is among the first 12 members of the EU and the other trader is 
among the most recent 12. After showing the effect of these dummies, I include interaction terms 
of the EU dummy variables with the cultural distance variable. The goal is to see whether 
cultural distance has a stronger or weaker effect on trade if both countries are members of the 
European Union. 
 
How does trade affect cultural distance? 
After showing the effect of cultural distance on trade, I next want to see how trade affects 
cultural distance. My expectation is that cultural distance falls as trade increases. Of course, 
many other variables are likely to affect the cultural distance between two countries. Per-capita 
GDP indicates a country’s level of development, and the level of development is likely to affect 
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culture. Geographical distance and sharing a border may affect cultural distance, since 
geographical proximity provides individuals with more opportunities to interact. Speaking a 
common language facilitates communication and so is likely to reduce cultural distance. Sharing 
a common colonizer is likely to reduce cultural distance, since it implies sharing a set of 
common founding institutions. Countries that are more similar in terms of religion and countries 
with common legal origins are likely to be less culturally distant. 
 
The cultural distance model is thus: Cultural Distanceij = f(Exportsij, (GDP per capitai - GDP per 
capitaj), Distanceij, Common Borderij, Common Languageij, Common Colonizerij, Religious 
Similarityij, Common Legal Originij ), where Cultural Distanceij and Exportsij are as defined 
earlier; (GDP per capitai - GDP per capitaj) is the absolute value of the difference in log per-
capita GDP of the two countries; and Common Borderij, Common Languageij, and Common 
Colonizerij are as defined earlier. Religious Similarityij is a variable created from data on religion 
from La Porta et al. (1999), who provide the percentage of a country’s residents in 1980 who 
identify as Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Other. I follow Guiso et al. (2009) in defining 
religious similarity as the probability that two randomly-selected individuals in the two countries 
will follow the same religion; this is calculated by multiplying together the percentage of 
individuals following a given religion in each country, and then summing over all religions 
(Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Other). Common Legal Originij uses data in La Porta et al. 
(1999) to create a dummy variable equal to 1 if both countries have the same legal origin 
(English, French, German, Socialist, or Scandinavian).  
 
My expectations are that exports will reduce cultural distance; the difference in GDP per capita 
will raise cultural distance; geographical distance will raise cultural distance; sharing a border, 
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speaking a common language, or sharing a common colonizer will reduce cultural distance; 
religious similarity will reduce cultural distance; and common legal origin will reduce cultural 
distance.  
 
As in the trade equation, I again add dummies for EU membership (both countries in the EU; 
both countries among the first 12 members of the EU; both countries among the most recent 12 
members of the EU; one country in the first 12 and one country in the most recent 12), and I then 
add interaction terms of the EU dummies with exports to see whether trade has a larger or 
smaller effect on cultural distance for EU members. 
 
EU membership has a correlation coefficient of -0.14 with cultural distance; EU countries are 
less culturally distant than other country-pairs in the sample. EU membership has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.20 with exports; EU countries trade more than other country-pairs in the sample. 
The regressions that will be run will show whether the high trade and low cultural distance 
between EU countries have a causal relationship, or can be explained by the other variables in 
the gravity and cultural distance equations. 
 
III.  Empirical Issues 
Specification 
The gravity regressions, as is common in the literature, are estimated in log-linear form, with 
exports, GDP, GDP per capita, and remoteness entering in natural logarithms and with the 
dummy variables entering directly. Since the World Values Survey is collected in five waves, 
only five years of trade data can be included. Panel data techniques such as fixed-effects panel 
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regression might then be the best way to estimate the coefficients. However, this is not a 
balanced panel; the World Values Survey does not survey every country in every year, and so 
while trade data are available, the cultural distance variable is not available for every country-
pair in every time period. Some countries are only surveyed once, in fact, and so country-pair 
fixed effects are not possible to estimate in this paper. All regressions therefore include year 
fixed effects and exporter and importer fixed effects, but not country-pair fixed effects. This is 
not out of line with other recent papers; Guiso et al. (2009) use both exporter and importer fixed 
effects, while Francois and Manchin (2007) use only importer fixed effects.  
 
Cultural distance 
As stated above, cultural distance between two countries is measured as the square root of the 
sum of the squared differences between each country’s trust, respect, control, and obedience 
measures. This formula is also used by Tadesse and White (2008), although they use other 
variables in their measure. Other measurement techniques are, of course, possible. De Groot et 
al. (2004) include a dummy variable that is equal to 0 if the difference between the country-
pair’s institutions exceeds a specified fraction of the sample standard deviation. Tabellini (2010) 
and Coyne and Williamson (2009) define culture as the sum of the trust, respect, and control 
variables, less the obedience variable, i.e., trust + respect + control – obedience, the idea being 
that trust, respect, and control encourage economic interactions, while obedience discourages 
such interactions. To measure cultural distance, one could then take the difference between two 
countries’ culture variables. Another possibility, also used by Tabellini (2010), is to take the first 
principal component of the four variables included in the culture variable to create a new 
variable to measure culture; again one could take the difference between two countries’ first 
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principal components to create a cultural distance variable. I have performed both of the 
variations found in Tabellini (2010) and the results are similar to those presented here. 
 
Selection bias 
The log of real exports is used as the dependent variable in the gravity regressions and as an 
independent variable in the cultural distance regressions; if a country-pair has zero trade, that 
observation will therefore drop out of the regression. This truncation is not ideal, as the fact that 
two countries do not trade is something that a trade regression should be able to explain. One 
method of addressing this problem is to use a Poisson estimator for the gravity equation (Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro 2006, Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2009). Most typically, however, 
researchers use a two-step Heckman procedure to measure the likelihood that a country-pair will 
experience positive trade, and then include that likelihood ratio in the gravity regression. Linders 
and de Groot (2006) perform a sample selection correction and then note that omitting the 
instances of zero trade “leads to satisfactory results” (15). Since only 7% of my country-pairs 
experience zero trade, the Heckman correction does not lead to a different outcome; I therefore 
do not report these results. 
 
Endogeneity 
Since it is likely that both cultural distance influences trade flows, and trade has an impact on 
cultural distance, then causality may be difficult to establish, and the coefficients in ordinary 
least squares regressions will be biased. For example, if an omitted variable simultaneously 
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causes a country-pair’s trade flows to be high and cultural distance to be low, then trade and 
cultural distance will be correlated even if there is no direct relationship between them.5 
 
There are two ways that I address this possible problem. The first is through exploiting the 
timing of the World Values Surveys, which are conducted in waves over a four- to five-year 
period in each case. Because of this, cultural distance is calculated for the overall period rather 
than for a particular year; that is, I calculate cultural distance for the 1981-1984 period, the 1989-
1993 period, the 1994-1998 period, the 1999-2004 period, and the 2005-2008 period, 
corresponding to the five waves of the WVS. While I have cultural distance data only for these 
time periods, I have trade data for every year. I therefore use trade data from the end of the 
period (i.e., 1984 for the 1981-1984 period, 1993 for the 1989-1993 period, and so on) in the 
trade regressions, so that cultural distance is primarily determined before the trade takes place. 
As well, I use trade data from the beginning of the period (i.e., 1981 for the 1981-1984 period, 
and so on) in the cultural distance regressions, so that trade is primarily determined before 
cultural distance is measured. The independent variables in the regressions have therefore 
occurred before the dependent variables have taken place, thereby lessening the causality 
problem. 
 
The second way that I address the endogeneity problem is through the use of instrumental 
variables, both for cultural distance (in the trade regression) and for trade (in the cultural distance 
regression). To be a valid instrument, a variable must be correlated with the variable in question 
and uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. In the gravity regression, I use two 
                                                            
5 The correlation coefficient between exports and cultural distance is in fact -0.08; countries that trade more are 
more similar in terms of culture. 
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instruments for cultural distance: the difference in the share of the population that was Protestant 
in 1980 (from LaPorta et al. 1999),6 and genetic distance in 1500 (from Spolaore and Wacziarg 
2009, based on Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994). 7 Genetic distance is “a measure associated with the 
time elapsed since two populations’ last common ancestors” (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009, 469). 
As Spolaore and Wacziarg state, “More closely related societies are more likely to learn from 
each other and adopt each other’s innovations” (470). Desmet et al. (2007) find that a measure of 
culture based on the World Values Survey is strongly related to genetic distance.  
 
I also find instruments for exports to use in the cultural distance equation. I use the latitude of the 
exporter and importer, the 1980 most-favoured nation average tariff rate (from the WTO), and 
the remoteness of each trading partner. Each of these is strongly related to trade, but uncorrelated 
with the error term in the cultural distance equation. 
 
As an estimator, I use the two-step feasible Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) IV 
estimator, since it is efficient in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Summary statistics 
are shown in Table 2. Data sources are shown in Appendix A, and the 90 countries included in 
the sample are listed in Appendix B. 
 
IV.  Results 
                                                            
6 Tabellini (2010) also finds that Protestantism, more than other religions, affects culture. Guiso et al. (2009) use a 
measure of overall religious similarity, but I found that using any religion other than Protestant proved to be a poor 
instrument.  
7 Other authors (Coyne and Williamson 2009, Disdier and Mayer 2007) commonly use a lag of the variable in 
question as its instrument. Unfortunately, such a technique is not possible in this case. Since the World Values 
Survey is not completed for every country in every time period, lagged cultural distance is not available for a 
majority of country-pairs.  
DRAFT: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
 
15 
 
Table 3 shows the determinants of trade. Column 1, which presents a baseline regression before 
the EU dummy variables are added, regresses exports on cultural distance, displaying a negative 
and highly significant relationship. The other explanatory variables do not always have the 
expected effects; for example, GDP does not have the predicted positive effect. However, the 
coefficient on GDP per capita is positive and strongly significant. Remoteness is insignificant, 
but the dummy variables all have the expected signs and are significant at the 99% level: sharing 
a border raises trade, being landlocked reduces trade, speaking a common language raises trade, 
and sharing a common colonizer raises trade. 
 
Columns 2 to 4 add the EU dummies. In column 2, a dummy variable is included that is equal to 
1 if both the exporter and the importer are members of the European Union. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient is negative, and it is highly significant: two countries trade less if they are in the EU 
than if they are not. Given that we know that the EU countries trade a great deal with each other, 
it must be that the other gravity variables (especially distance and sharing a border) are providing 
the explanation for trade within the EU. Column 3 adds two dummies, one that is equal to 1 
when the two trading partners are both among the first 12 members of the EU, and another 
dummy that is equal to 1 if the two trading partners are both among the most recent 12 members 
to join the EU. Interestingly, we see that the first 12 members trade less among themselves than 
would a pair of countries with the same gravity characteristics, while the new members trade 
more among themselves. Column 4 includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one trading 
partner is among the first 12 members of the EU and the other trading partner is among the 12 
most recent members; the coefficient on this variable is insignificantly different from zero. 
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Table 4 shows the trade regressions with the interaction terms included. The dummies for EU 
membership are mostly the same as in Table 3 except in the significance level of the dummy 
representing trade between one of the first 12 members and one of the newest 12 members 
(which was negative but insignificant in Table 3, and is now negative and significant). The 
interaction terms tell us whether cultural distance has a stronger or weaker effect on trade for EU 
members, relative to the baseline negative effect. As before, column 1 presents a baseline 
regression before any dummy variables or interaction terms are included. In column 2, cultural 
distance is interacted with the dummy variable representing membership in the EU; the 
coefficient is positive but insignificantly different from zero. In column 3, cultural distance is 
interacted with the dummy variable representing the first 12 members of the EU as well as with 
the dummy variable representing the most recent 12 members. The latter is insignificant, but the 
interaction term representing the first 12 members is positive and significant. The overall effect 
of cultural distance on trade for the first 12 members of the EU is thus the sum of the cultural 
distance coefficient (-0.019) and the coefficient on the interaction term (0.029). Since it is 
positive overall, we can say that, surprisingly, cultural distance raises rather than lowers trade for 
the first 12 members of the EU. In column 4, I include an interaction term of cultural distance 
with the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one trading partner is among the first 12 members 
of the EU and the other trading partner is among the most recent 12 members. This coefficient is 
again positive and significant, but the sum of the cultural distance and interaction term 
coefficients this time is still negative; cultural distance reduces trade for these country-pairs. 
 
Table 5 presents the determinants of cultural distance. Column 1 is a baseline regression before 
the dummy variables are added. The coefficient on exports is both highly significant and 
DRAFT: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
 
17 
 
positive: holding all else constant, exports raise cultural distance. The control variables are all 
significant and most have the expected signs. Differences in GDP per capita are highly 
significant and have a positive coefficient; countries that are of similar levels of development are 
also more similar culturally. Geographical distance also has a positive and significant coefficient; 
countries that are closer to each other have more similar cultures, due possibly to the increased 
exposure that close proximity allows. Surprisingly, sharing a border increases cultural distance. 
The common language dummy has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 90% level; 
sharing a language reduces cultural distance. The common colonizer dummy is both negative and 
highly significant; being colonized by the same country reduces a country-pair’s cultural 
distance, possibly because the colonizer imposed similar institutions. Religious similarity and 
common legal origin both have the expected negative sign and are significant at the 99% level. 
 
Columns 2 to 4 add the EU dummies. Column 2 shows that, if both countries are part of the 
European Union, their cultural distance increases, holding constant the other variables in the 
regression. The same is true if both countries are among the first 12 members, as shown in 
column 3. However, column 3 also shows that, if both countries are among the newest 12 
members of the EU, their cultural distance is lower than otherwise. Finally, column 4 shows that 
older and newer members have higher cultural distance than otherwise.  
 
Table 6 shows the cultural distance regressions with interaction terms. In each column, exports 
have the same positive sign; holding all else constant, trade increases the cultural distance 
between countries. However, to see the effect of trade for EU groupings, the coefficients on 
exports and on the relevant interaction term must be added together. As before, column 1 shows 
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a baseline regression. In column 2, adding together the exports coefficient (1.18) and the 
interaction term of exports with EU membership (-3.27) provides a negative number, showing 
that, for EU members, trade reduces cultural distance. The interaction terms with the dummy 
variables for the first 12 members and the most recent 12 members are both insignificant (shown 
in column 3), but the interaction term of exports with the dummy variable representing trade 
between one of the first 12 members and one of the newest 12 members is negative and 
significant; the sum of the interaction term coefficient (-4.79) and the exports coefficient (1.88) 
is negative, showing that trade reduces the cultural distance between the older members and the 
newer members of the EU. 
 
To enable a comparison of the various impacts on trade and cultural distance, I compute 
standardized beta coefficients, which show the effect of a 1 standard-deviation change in the 
independent variable on the standard deviation of the dependent variable; the size of the 
coefficient therefore indicates the variable’s relative importance in explaining the dependent 
variable. I use the regressions with interaction terms to compute the beta coefficients, which are 
shown in Tables 7 and 8. In the trade equation, shown in Table 7, the per-capita GDP of the 
importer and landlocked status are shown to be the most important determinants of trade. 
Cultural distance is roughly one-third as important as geographical distance in explaining trade. 
The EU dummies and interaction terms are not as important as the standard gravity variables. In 
the culture equation, shown in Table 8, exports and distance are shown to be generally the most 
important explanatory variables in explaining cultural distance. However, in column 2, which 
includes a dummy variable for EU membership, that variable is that most important explanation 
for cultural distance, and the interaction term of the EU dummy with exports is highly important 
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in reducing cultural distance. Similarly, in column 4, cultural distance is shown to be explained 
by a dummy variable for trade between old and new members of the EU, but the interaction term 
representing trade between the old and new members is very important in reducing the cultural 
distance between these countries. The conclusion is apparently that EU membership itself does 
nothing to reduce cultural distance, but trade between EU members does a great deal to reduce 
countries’ cultural distance. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the relationship between exports and cultural distance for 90 countries 
between 1981 and 2008, focusing on the European Union. There is a negative correlation 
between exports and cultural distance, but the relationship becomes more complex when control 
variables are added. 
 
The gravity model shows the effect on bilateral exports of GDP, distance, GDP per capita, 
remoteness, contiguity, landlocked status, speaking a common language, and having a common 
colonizer. Cultural distance is added as an explanatory variable, instrumented by genetic distance 
and the difference in the share of the population identifying as Protestant. The results show that 
country-pairs that are more culturally distant therefore trade less, except for country-pairs that 
are both among the first 12 members of the EU. Country-pairs that are both in the European 
Union, or that are both among the first 12 members, trade less than otherwise, but country-pairs 
that are among the most recent entrants trade more than other. 
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To determine the causes of cultural distance, I regress cultural distance on per-capita GDP 
differences, distance, contiguity, speaking a common language, having a common colonizer, 
being more similar in terms of religion, and having a common legal origin. I include exports to 
see whether trade reduces or raises cultural distance, instrumenting exports with remoteness, 
latitude, and tariffs. The results show that, holding constant the other determinants of cultural 
distance, exports raise rather than lower cultural distance for the average country-pair. However, 
exports reduce cultural distance for country-pairs in the European Union and country-pairs in 
which one country is among the oldest members of the EU and the other country is among the 
newest. 
 
Many of the European Union’s policies have been aimed at reducing the barriers between EU 
countries. Using the World Values Survey as a way of measuring culture, this paper has shown 
that being part of the EU raises a country-pair’s cultural distance; while EU membership is 
negatively correlated with cultural distance, this is explained by their similar per-capita GDPs 
and close geographical proximity, not their EU membership. However, the trade that is 
encouraged by the EU’s policies of integration does have an effect of bringing countries closer 
together in terms of culture. 
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Table 1A: Trust in the European Union 
 
 1981-84 1989-93 1994-98 1999-2004 2005-08 
Austria  28.2 31.3  
Belgium 25.1 30.6 29.4  
Bulgaria  28.7 23.7 24.9 19.6 
Cyprus  9.7 
Czech Republic  27.4 27.2 23.4  
Denmark 45.9 55.5 64.1  
Estonia  27.6 21.1 21.7  
Finland  59.5 47.9 56.8 58.0 
France 22.3 21.4 21.4 18.7 
Germany 25.9 26.8 32.1 35.9 33.8 
Greece  20.5  
Hungary 31.9 23.8 22.5 21.4  
Ireland 40.0 46.8 35.2  
Italy 24.5 32.8 31.8 27.5 
Latvia  19.0 23.9 16.7  
Lithuania  30.8 21.3 23.4  
Luxembourg  24.9  
Malta 9.4 22.9 20.4  
Netherlands 38.1 50.3 59.4 42.6 
Poland  28.4 16.9 18.3 18.1 
Portugal  20.7 9.8  
Romania  15.8 17.9 9.9 19.3 
Slovakia  21.3 25.8 15.2  
Slovenia  16.3 15.3 21.2 17.5 
Spain 32.2 32.1 28.7 34.5 19.8 
Sweden 52.1 59.6 56.6 63.7 65.2 
United Kingdom 42.5 42.1 30.4 28.5 30.0 
Note: Trust is the percentage of respondents who agree that “most people can be trusted.” 
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Table 1B: Respect in the European Union 
 
 1981-84 1989-93 1994-98 1999-2004 2005-08 
Austria  66.6 71.4  
Belgium 45.3 69.5 83.0  
Bulgaria  51.5 46.4 59.3 53.8 
Cyprus  70.6 
Czech Republic  66.1 60.0 63.0  
Denmark 57.8 80.9 87.3  
Estonia  70.2 59.6 71.3  
Finland  80.3 82.5 82.7 86.9 
France 58.6 78.3 85.2 86.8 
Germany 42.0 75.0 88.3 72.0 75.1 
Greece  52.5  
Hungary 30.8 61.7 63.5 65.6  
Ireland 55.6 76.4 75.0  
Italy 43.1 66.1 75.0 74.4 
Latvia  69.7 72.5 69.5  
Lithuania  56.7 54.1 57.6  
Luxembourg  78.1  
Malta 24.4 41.3 61.0  
Netherlands 57.1 88.1 91.1 86.6 
Poland  76.5 81.5 80.1 84.9 
Portugal  69.6 65.4  
Romania  56.0 72.1 58.3 59.7 
Slovakia  55.2 57.1 57.0  
Slovenia  74.5 72.0 70.1 75.9 
Spain 44.2 73.0 75.6 79.7 72.3 
Sweden 71.1 90.8 90.4 92.5 93.6 
United Kingdom 62.1 79.2 85.9 83.0 85.3 
Note: Respect is the percentage of respondents who say that “tolerance and respect for other people” is a quality that 
it is important for children to learn at home. 
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Table 1C: Control in the European Union 
 
 1981-84 1989-93 1994-98 1999-2004 2005-08 
Austria  76 75  
Belgium 63 65 66  
Bulgaria  52 53 62 58 
Cyprus  75 
Czech Republic  66 65 69  
Denmark 70 70 73  
Estonia  63 60 60  
Finland  76 77 74 75 
France 63 62 64 67 
Germany 70 68 69 72 68 
Greece  70  
Hungary 68 65 64 62  
Ireland 69 71 73  
Italy 55 64 63 63 
Latvia  64 56 58  
Lithuania  66 61 63  
Luxembourg  70  
Malta 71 74 74  
Netherlands 59 62 67 67 
Poland  62 62 66 
Portugal  66 68  
Romania  63 63 67 76 
Slovakia  66 64 63  
Slovenia  64 69 72 75 
Spain 65 68 63 67 69 
Sweden 70 75 73 74 78 
United Kingdom 67 70 72 73 
Note: Control is the average response (from 1 to 100) that indicates how much “freedom of choice and control in 
life” respondents feel. 
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Table 1D: Obedience in the European Union 
 
 1981-84 1989-93 1994-98 1999-2004 2005-08 
Austria  25.5 16.7  
Belgium 28.2 37.4 42.8  
Bulgaria  18.7 20.3 15.8 25.0 
Cyprus  49.9 
Czech Republic  20.9 14.0 17.2  
Denmark 13.6 20.3 14.4  
Estonia  18.8 27.0 28.5  
Finland  25.6 28.1 30.2 32.8 
France 17.6 53.0 35.6 41.2 
Germany 15.5 23.9 12.3 13.7 15.9 
Greece  10.8  
Hungary 30.9 44.8 30.8 33.3  
Ireland 33.4 35.2 47.9  
Italy 27.3 33.8 27.8 26.3 
Latvia  15.3 19.4 20.4  
Lithuania  24.5 22.9 19.7  
Luxembourg  26.1  
Malta 24.0 55.5 41.1  
Netherlands 23.1 33.6 25.5 40.2 
Poland  42.0 48.7 32.5 48.8 
Portugal  45.6 38.8  
Romania  19.5 13.7 18.8 17.8 
Slovakia  35.7 26.8 26.4  
Slovenia  39.8 28.2 25.1 31.7 
Spain 29.7 43.0 43.8 48.7 37.2 
Sweden 13.3 24.9 15.9 12.7 15.6 
United Kingdom 37.1 39.4 49.6 48.8 46.2 
Note: Obedience is the percentage of respondents who say that “obedience” is a quality that it is important for 
children to learn at home. 
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Table 2A: Summary Statistics for the Trade Regressions 
(Using Export Data for 1984, 1993, 1998, 2004, and 2008) 
 
 Mean Standard deviation 
ln(Exportsij) 12.61 3.44 
Cultural Distanceij 34.31 15.09 
ln(GDPi) 18.50 1.94 
ln(GDPj) 18.49 1.97 
ln(GDPi/POPi) 8.53 1.43 
ln(GDPj/POPj) 8.49 1.45 
ln(Distanceij) 7.95 0.96 
ln(Remotenessi) -32.63 0.32 
ln(Remotenessj) -32.63 0.31 
Trade Agreementij 0.043 0.20 
Common Borderij 0.045 0.21 
Landlockedij 0.28 0.49  
Common Languageij 0.10 0.30 
Common Colonizerij 0.032 0.18 
 
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for the Cultural Distance Regressions 
(Using Export Data for 1981, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2005) 
 
 Mean Standard deviation 
ln(Exportsij) 12.27 3.52 
Cultural Distanceij 34.66 15.24 
|ln(GDPi/POPi) –  
ln(GDPj/POPj)| 
1.70 1.25 
ln(Distanceij) 7.98 0.95   
Common Borderij 0.043 0.20 
Common Languageij 0.11 0.31 
Common Colonizerij 0.033   0.18 
Religious Similarityij 0.29 0.27 
Common Legal Originij 0.27 0.44 
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Table 3: The Effect of Cultural Distance on Trade (without interaction terms) 
 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) 
EU  
 
-0.24*** 
(0.068) 
  
EUold  
 
 -0.99*** 
(0.075) 
 
EUnew  
 
 0.41*** 
(0.090) 
 
EUoldnew    -0.024 
(0.054) 
Cultural Distanceij -0.029*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.028*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.027*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.029*** 
(0.0052) 
ln(GDPi) -0.33 
(0.47) 
-0.18 
(0.47) 
-0.26 
(0.47) 
-0.30 
(0.47) 
ln(GDPj) -1.26*** 
(0.43) 
-1.12***
(0.43) 
-1.19***
(0.43) 
-1.23***
(0.43) 
ln(Distanceij) -1.36*** 
(0.035) 
-1.41*** 
(0.040) 
-1.40*** 
(0.035) 
-1.36*** 
(0.036) 
ln(GDPi/POPi) 1.06*** 
(0.47) 
0.93*** 
(0.47) 
1.04***
(0.47) 
1.04*** 
(0.47) 
ln(GDPj/POPj) 2.17*** 
(0.43) 
2.07***
(0.42) 
2.16***
(0.42) 
2.16*** 
(0.43) 
ln(Remotenessi) -0.33 
(1.25) 
-0.36 
(1.25) 
-0.63 
(1.23) 
-0.44 
(1.25) 
ln(Remotenessj) -2.44 
(1.81) 
-2.80 
(1.81) 
-3.04 
(1.79) 
-2.74 
(1.81) 
Common Borderij  0.29*** 
(0.081) 
0.25***
(0.081) 
0.33***
(0.079) 
0.28*** 
(0.082) 
Landlockedij -5.40*** 
(1.05) 
-5.17***
(1.05) 
-5.19***
(1.05) 
-5.35***
(1.05) 
Common Languageij  0.53*** 
(0.063) 
0.52***
(0.063) 
0.48***
(0.062) 
0.53*** 
(0.063) 
Common Colonizerij 1.67*** 
(0.13) 
1.67***
(0.13) 
1.70***
(0.13) 
1.67*** 
(0.13) 
     
R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real exports from country i to country j. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. A constant term is included but not reported. Genetic distance in the year 
1500 and the difference in the percentage of the population that was Protestant in 1980 are used as instruments for 
cultural distance. All regressions include year fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, and importer fixed effects. The 
number of observations is 9810. * represents 90% significance; ** represents 95% significance; *** represents 99% 
significance.  
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Table 4: The Effect of Cultural Distance on Trade (with interaction terms) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU  
 
-0.47*** 
(0.17) 
  
EUold  
 
 -1.75*** 
(0.22) 
 
EUnew  
 
 1.32* 
(0.80) 
 
EUoldnew    -0.50* 
(0.27) 
Cultural Distanceij -0.029*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.019*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.029*** 
(0.0052) 
Cultural Distanceij × EU  0.0078 
(0.0050) 
  
Cultural Distanceij × EUold   0.029***
(0.0075) 
 
Cultural Distanceij × 
EUnew 
  -0.042
(0.039) 
 
Cultural Distanceij × 
EUoldnew 
   0.016* 
(0.0089) 
ln(GDPi) -0.33 
(0.47) 
-0.30 
(0.47) 
-0.10 
(0.47) 
-0.30 
(0.47) 
ln(GDPj) -1.26*** 
(0.43) 
-1.19***
(0.43) 
-1.04**
(0.44) 
-1.21*** 
(0.43) 
ln(Distanceij) -1.36*** 
(0.035) 
-1.39*** 
(0.040) 
-1.43*** 
(0.035) 
-1.36*** 
(0.036) 
ln(GDPi/POPi) 1.06*** 
(0.47) 
1.04*** 
(0.47) 
0.94**
(0.48) 
1.06*** 
(0.47) 
ln(GDPj/POPj) 2.17*** 
(0.43) 
2.07***
(0.43) 
2.06***
(0.43) 
2.14*** 
(0.43) 
ln(Remotenessi) -0.33 
(1.25) 
-0.30 
(1.25) 
-0.55 
(1.23) 
-0.42 
(1.24) 
ln(Remotenessj) -2.44 
(1.81) 
-1.70 
(1.81) 
-2.92 
(1.80) 
-2.66 
(1.79) 
Common Borderij  0.29*** 
(0.081) 
0.27***
(0.082) 
0.35***
(0.079) 
0.28*** 
(0.081) 
Landlockedij -5.40*** 
(1.05) 
-5.29***
(1.05) 
-4.84***
(1.06) 
-5.26*** 
(1.05) 
Common Languageij  0.53*** 
(0.063) 
0.52***
(0.063) 
0.49***
(0.062) 
0.53*** 
(0.063) 
Common Colonizerij 1.67*** 
(0.13) 
1.58***
(0.13) 
1.78***
(0.13) 
1.65*** 
(0.13) 
     
R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of real exports from country i to country j. Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. A constant term is included but not reported. Genetic distance in the year 1500 and the difference in the percentage of the 
population that was Protestant in 1980 are used as instruments for cultural distance. All regressions include year fixed effects, exporter fixed 
effects, and importer fixed effects. The number of observation is 9810. * represents 90% significance; ** represents 95% significance; *** 
represents 99% significance.   
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Table 5: The Effect of Trade on Cultural Distance (without interaction terms) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU  
 
3.39*** 
(0.51) 
  
EUold  
 
 7.96*** 
(0.84) 
 
EUnew  
 
 -5.42*** 
(0.73) 
 
EUoldnew  
 
  2.19*** 
(0.53) 
ln(Exportsij) 1.94*** 
(0.29) 
1.71*** 
(0.29) 
2.17*** 
(0.32) 
1.87*** 
(0.29) 
|ln(GDPi/POPi) –  
ln(GDPj/POPj)| 
2.74*** 
(0.13) 
2.82*** 
(0.13) 
2.93*** 
(0.13) 
2.70*** 
(0.13) 
ln(Distanceij) 5.77*** 
(0.46) 
6.06***
(0.46) 
6.24***
(0.50) 
5.80*** 
(0.45) 
Common Borderij 1.13* 
(0.66) 
1.62**
(0.65) 
0.74
(0.66) 
1.36** 
(0.66) 
Common Languageij -0.88* 
(0.51) 
-0.79
(0.50) 
-0.72
(0.51) 
-0.93* 
(0.51) 
Common Colonizerij -7.63*** 
(0.85) 
-7.01*** 
(0.84) 
-8.27*** 
(0.89) 
-7.53*** 
(0.84) 
Religious Similarityij -3.46*** 
(0.49) 
-3.38*** 
(0.48) 
-3.66*** 
(0.49) 
-3.59*** 
(0.49) 
Common Legal Originij -4.53*** 
(0.35) 
-4.24*** 
(0.35) 
-4.23*** 
(0.36) 
-4.28*** 
(0.36) 
     
R2 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 
Note: The dependent variable is cultural distance between country i and country j. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. A constant term is included but not reported. Latitude, tariffs in 1980, and 
remoteness are used as instruments for exports. All regressions include year fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, and 
importer fixed effects. The number of observations is 9245. * represents 90% significance; ** represents 95% 
significance; *** represents 99% significance. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Trade on Cultural Distance (with interaction terms) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU  
 
49.04*** 
(13.29) 
  
EUold  
 
 1.74 
(25.33) 
 
EUnew  
 
 1.44 
(15.15) 
 
EUoldnew  
 
  67.33*** 
(13.27) 
ln(Exportsij) 1.94*** 
(0.29) 
1.18*** 
(0.25) 
2.31*** 
(0.33) 
1.88*** 
(0.27) 
ln(Exportsij) × EU 
 
 -3.27*** 
(0.95) 
  
ln(Exportsij) × EUold   0.41 
(1.51) 
 
ln(Exportsij) × EUnew   -0.60 
(1.30) 
 
ln(Exportsij) × EUoldnew    -4.79*** 
(0.99) 
|ln(GDPi/POPi) –  
ln(GDPj/POPj)| 
2.74*** 
(0.13) 
2.45*** 
(0.17) 
2.95*** 
(0.14) 
2.75*** 
(0.13) 
ln(Distanceij) 5.77*** 
(0.46) 
4.88***
(0.46) 
6.43***
(0.52) 
5.55*** 
(0.43) 
Common Borderij 1.13* 
(0.66) 
3.75***
(0.91) 
0.68
(0.80) 
1.45** 
(0.67) 
Common Languageij -0.88* 
(0.51) 
-0.85*
(0.50) 
-0.77
(0.52) 
-1.02** 
(0.50) 
Common Colonizerij -7.63*** 
(0.85) 
-4.96*** 
(0.93) 
-8.35*** 
(0.93) 
-7.02*** 
(0.81) 
Religious Similarityij -3.46*** 
(0.49) 
-3.35*** 
(0.48) 
-3.70*** 
(0.51) 
-3.50*** 
(0.49) 
Common Legal Originij -4.53*** 
(0.35) 
-4.49*** 
(0.36) 
-4.23*** 
(0.36) 
-4.43*** 
(0.36) 
     
R2 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Note: The dependent variable is cultural distance between country i and country j. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. A constant term is included but not reported. Latitude, tariffs in 1980, and 
remoteness are used as instruments for exports. All regressions include year fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, and 
importer fixed effects. The number of observations is 9245. * represents 90% significance; ** represents 95% 
significance; *** represents 99% significance. 
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Table 7: Beta Coefficients: Trade Equation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU  
 
-0.05   
EUold  
 
 -0.09  
EUnew  
 
 0.07  
EUoldnew  
 
  -0.03 
Cultural Distanceij -0.13 
 
-0.14 -0.08 -0.13 
Cultural Distanceij × EU  
 
0.03   
Cultural Distanceij × EUold  
 
 0.04  
Cultural Distanceij × EUnew 
 
  -0.05  
Cultural Distanceij × EUoldnew 
 
   0.04 
ln(GDPi) -0.18 
 
-0.17 -0.06 -0.17 
ln(GDPj) -0.72 
 
-0.68 -0.59 -0.69 
ln(Distanceij) -0.38 
 
-0.39 -0.40 -0.38 
ln(GDPi/POPi) 0.44 
 
0.43 0.39 0.44 
ln(GDPj/POPj) 0.91 
 
0.87 0.87 0.90 
ln(Remotenessi) -0.03 
 
-0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
ln(Remotenessj) -0.22 
 
-0.16 -0.27 -0.24 
Common Borderij  0.02 
 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
Landlockedij -0.77 
 
-0.75 -0.69 -0.75 
Common Languageij  0.05 
 
0.05 0.04 0.05 
Common Colonizerij 0.09 
 
0.08 0.09 0.08 
Note: A beta coefficient shows the effect of a 1 standard-deviation change in the independent variable on the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The coefficients are calculated based on the regressions in Table 4. 
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Table 8: Beta Coefficients: Culture Equation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU  
 
1.12   
EUold  
 
 0.02  
EUnew  
 
 0.01  
EUoldnew  
 
  0.98 
ln(Exportsij) 0.45 
 
0.27 0.53 0.43 
ln(Exportsij) × EU 
 
 
 
-1.08   
ln(Exportsij) × EUold  
 
 0.08  
ln(Exportsij) × EUnew  
 
 -0.07  
ln(Exportsij) × EUoldnew  
 
  -0.96 
ln(GDPi/POPi) –  
ln(GDPj/POPj) 
0.23 0.20 0.24 0.23 
ln(Distanceij) 0.36 
 
0.30 0.40 0.35 
Common Borderij 0.02 
 
0.05 0.01 0.02 
Common Languageij -0.02 
 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Common Colonizerij -0.09 
 
-0.06 -0.10 -0.08 
Religious Similarityij -0.06 
 
-0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
Common Legal Originij -0.13 
 
-0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
Note: A beta coefficient shows the effect of a 1 standard-deviation change in the independent variable on the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The coefficients are calculated based on the regressions in Table 6. 
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
 
The cultural distance data (comprising the trust, control, respect, and obedience variables) are 
from the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
 
Export data are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics; data prior to the year 2000 were 
obtained from Andy Rose (http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/). 
 
GDP and population data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Distance is calculated using the great-circle method and was obtained from Andy Rose 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/). 
 
The dummy variables representing membership in a trade agreement, contiguity, landlocked 
status, common language, and common colonizer were obtained from Andy Rose 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/). 
 
The religious similarity variable was calculated from data found in La Porta et al. (1999). 
The common legal origin variable was constructed from data found in La Porta et al. (1999). 
Genetic distance in the year 1500 is from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), based on Cavalli-
Sforza et al. (1994). 
 
The difference in the share of the population that identified as Protestant in 1980 is from La 
Porta et al. (1999). 
 
The latitude data are from La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
The average MFN tariff rate in 1980 is from the World Trade Organization. 
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Appendix B: Countries Included 
 
Albania   Germany   Pakistan 
Algeria   Ghana    Peru 
Argentina    Greece    Philippines 
Armenia   Hong Kong   Poland 
Australia   Hungary   Portugal 
Austria   Iceland   Romania 
Azerbaijan   India    Russia 
Bangladesh   Indonesia   Rwanda 
Belarus   Iran    Saudi Arabia 
Belgium   Iraq    Singapore 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ireland    Slovakia 
Brazil     Israel    Slovenia 
Bulgaria   Italy    South Africa 
Burkina Faso   Japan    South Korea 
Canada    Jordan    Spain 
Chile     Kyrgyzstan   Sweden 
China     Latvia    Switzerland 
Colombia   Lithuania   Tanzania 
Croatia   Luxembourg   Thailand 
Cyprus    Macedonia   Trinidad and Tobago 
Czech Republic  Malaysia   Turkey 
Denmark   Mali    Uganda 
Dominican Republic  Malta    Ukraine 
Egypt    Mexico   United Kingdom 
El Salvador   Moldova   United States 
Estonia   Morocco   Uruguay 
Ethiopia   Netherlands   Venezuela 
Finland   New Zealand   Vietnam 
France    Nigeria   Zambia 
Georgia   Norway   Zimbabwe 
 
